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Abstract
The adoption of Sharia law and the creation of an Islamic government are prominent motivations for religious
terrorism within the current climate. Throughout history, Nigeria has been exposed to ethno religious violence
and political discontent and has recently seen an escalation in associated violence threatening its sovereignty,
territorial integrity, peace and stability. This paper explores Boko Haram, a Nigerian Islamist sect, responsible
for numerous attacks in northern and central Nigeria on infrastructure and people. The origins and ideological
motivations of this group are examined and compared to the current wave of religious terrorism in relation to
tactics, leadership and objectives. Parallels and relationships are drawn between Boko Haram and other
proscribed terrorist organizations such as al-Qa’ida, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the
Somalian al Shabaab. This paper defines Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, as opposed to religious
fanatics or freedom fighters, other common views about this group. This paper takes an Australian legislative
approach to defining terrorism and terrorist organizations and examines Boko Haram against a contemporary
terrorist organization proscribed by the Australian Government, AQIM, to substantiate claims that this
organization demonstrates features common among terrorist organizations. Future prospects of this group,
including potential expansion and listing them as a terrorist organization by the Australian government for
national security, are presented.
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INTRODUCTION
Boko Haram can be understood as an Islamist insurgency that has risen from political and religious discontent
within Nigeria (Adasoji, 2011; Onuoha, 2012; Soloman, 2012). This extremist sect threatens the security,
sovereignty and stability of Nigeria, particularly northern Nigeria, by a range of high profile attacks on the
military, police, schools, political figures and other infrastructure (Nicoll, 2011; Think Security Africa, 2011).
Group evolution and differing interpretations regarding motivations, presented challenges in defining this group
from a local, national and international perspective (Walker, 2012). From various viewpoints Boko Haram can
be considered as; a terrorist organization, freedom fighters or religious fanatics. Through an examination of the
origins and philosophy of Boko Haram, comparisons with established terrorist organizations such as AQIM, and
against the Australian definition of terrorism, Boko Haram can be described as a terrorist organization with both
political and religious motives. Providing that intelligence continues to support links and cooperation between
Boko Haram and other proscribed terrorist organizations, listing the group as a terrorist organization in the near
future is necessary for an international counter-terrorism approach and to continue to secure Australian interests
at home and abroad in the future (Adesoji, 2011; Devlin-Foltz, 2010; US House of Representatives Committee,
2011).
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Origins and philosophy of Boko Haram
Boko Haram are a Nigerian militant Islamist sect which seeks political and religious reform within Nigeria
specifically the adoption of Sharia law with beliefs based in the practise of Orthodox Islam (Bagaji et al, 2012 ;
Onuoha, 2012; Soloman, 2012; Walker, 2012). This interpretation of Islam abhors and rejects western
civilisation and education as sacrilegious and the name ‘Boko Haram’ derives from this belief (Adasoji, 2011;
Anonymous, 2009; Onuoha, 2012; Soloman, 2012). This fanatical Islamist sect recruits from the northern
provinces of Nigeria targeting disaffected youths, unemployed university students and street children
(Almajiris) by addressing grievances and radicalises its members (Nicoll, 2011; Onuoha, 2012). This group
threatens Nigeria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, peace and stability by targeting symbols of authority within
Nigeria as well as committing a broad range of crimes such as robberies and acts of vandalism, however, their
influence appears localised at this stage with developing operational links to international terrorists
organizations in relation to training (Anonymous, 2011; Roti, 2012; Think Security Africa, 2011a; University of
Nigeria, 2012; US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Counterterroism and Intelligence, 2011).
Boko Haram manifested post the independence of Nigeria in 1960 which saw a shift of power to the Christian
south, the success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 which saw Sharia law adopted, the return of civil rule and
democracy in Nigeria in 1999, as well as a strong promotion of orthodoxy and Wahhabi doctrine in the 1990’s
within Sub-Saharan Africa (Adasoji, 2011; Nicoll, 2011; Soloman, 2012). Within Nigeria, religion has played a
crucial part in politics and society pre and post-independence, with religion and state seemingly inseparable,
therefore in the last three decades Nigeria has experienced recurrent religious and ethno-religious hostilities and
conflicts (Bagaji et al, 2012; Isichei, 1987). Boko Haram can be seen to have risen out of a change in political
landscape and sponsored by political discontent with political and religious aims (Anonymous, n.d; Bagaji et al,
2012; Walker, 2012).
The Nigerian Director of Defence Information, Colonel Mohammed Yerima, has identified that the emergence
of Boko Haram originated as early as 1995 under various names, such as Ahlulsunna wal’ jama’ah hijra,
however rose to notoriety in 2009 (Onuoha, 2012; Soloman, 2012). This group originated by the creation of a
separatist community that espoused hard-line Islamic principles after embarking on a Hirja. However they soon
evolved into a group that were perpetrating many acts of violence (Walker, 2012). Boko Haram, or ‘People
committed to the Prophets teaching for Propagation and Jihad,’ was founded by Muslim cleric Mohammed
Yusuf and operates in the North-eastern states of Nigeria, primarily Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe (Adasoji,
2011; Onuoha, 2012; Think Security Africa, 2011b). Locals refer to the sect as the ‘Nigerian Taliban’ (Thin
Africa, 2011a). Since 2009 and the death of their leader, attacks perpetrated by this group have grown in
lethality and sophistication and the group has become increasingly cell-like in structure, killing 253 people in
January 2012 (Soloman, 2012; Think Security Africa, 2011; Walker, 2012). The sect has engaged in targeted
killings, kidnappings, shootings, fire bombings, bombings including IED’s, VBIEDS and suicide bombing
(Onuoha, 2012; Think Security Africa, 2011b; Walker, 2012). Target selection has evolved from a focus on
Nigerian Security Forces to also include politicians, military, police, critical infrastructure, civilians,
government infrastructure, schools, churches and a UN building (Gruenbaum , 2009; Soloman, 2012; Think
Security Africa, 2011b). There is a synergy between the tactics and targets of Boko Haram to their objectives,
for example the assassination of a candidate for the governor of Borno from the All Nigeria People’s Party
whose beliefs did not align with the political objectives of this group (Nicoll, 2011; Think Security Africa,
2011b).
Defining terrorism and examining Boko Haram from an Australian Perspective
An act of terrorism as defined by the Commonwealth of Australian Government under the Criminal Code Act
1995 Section 100.1 and the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act (C’th) 2002, Part 5.3, Terrorist
Division 100, would consider Boko Haram to have committed acts of terrorism under sub section 2, 2b and 2c
but not sub Section 2a of the legislation. They have intended to advance a religious and political cause by
committing act 2b under this section (that is orthodox Islamism and the establishment of Sharia law), and have
done these actions with the intent of influencing by intimidation a government and the public, thus
demonstrating an act of 2c (by aiming to intimidate the Nigerian government to creating Sharia law and
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intimidate the Christian public) (Adasoji, 2011; Nicoll, 2011; Soloman, 2012). Boko Haram have also fulfilled
sub Section 2 by causing serious harm that is physical harm to a person (Anonymous, 2009; Onuoha, 2012).
Acts committed by this group have not been advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action that is not intended to
cause serious harm that is physical harm to a person. From this perspective the Australian definition disregards
the idea they are freedom fighters, average criminals or religious fanatics, alternative arguments regarding the
definition of Boko Haram (Fischer, 2011). Although taken from an Australia perspective it is important to
understand that defining terrorism is a matter of perspective, with over 100 definitions worldwide, however
essentially most definitions involve the inclusion of elements such as; the use of violence, targets noncombatants, creates a state of fear, aims to influence, intimidate or coerce and being motivated by political,
social and ideological objectives (Aly, 2011). Boko Haram’s actions would be considered terrorism under most
definitions that present these core elements.
As an organization and defined in section 102.1(1) of the Criminal Code, Boko Haram would meet the
requirements to be defined and proscribed as a terrorist organization. There is evidence Boko Haram have
engaged in preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the perpetration of terrorist acts (Anonymous, 2009;
Security in Nigeria, 2011; Walker, 2012). Boko Haram however is not proscribed as a terrorist organization by
the Australian Government. Defining Boko Haram as a terrorist organization would assist in an international
counter terrorism approach and securing Australia’s security, Australian’s and Australian interests nationally
and internationally in the future. The Australian Counter Terrorism White Paper (2010) identifies a real and
enduring threat from international terrorism in the form of violent jihadist movements to Australia
compromising predominately of groups associated with al-Qa’ida and similar views (Department of the Prime
Minister and Cabinet, 2010). Scholars, Algerian Intelligence and the Nigerian government have identified that
Boko Haram have participated in training with, and has links to, extremist groups such as AQIM and al Shabaab
in Somalia (US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterroism
and Intelligence, 2011). There is a potential, based on intelligence produced by Algerian intelligence,
supporting the fact that the group could become an incubator for international terrorism, expand, join the global
jihadist movement and associate with al-Qa’ida (Adesoji, 2011; Devlin-Foltz, 2010; Onuoha, 2012; Solomon,
2012; US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterroism and
Intelligence, 2011). The White Paper in 2010 acknowledged the rise of affiliated groups within new areas such
as Yemen and Somalia that have offset counter-terrorism success in other areas internationally, and Algerian
government intelligence has highlighted links with Boko Haram and Somalian al Shabaab (Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010; House of Representatives, 2011). Until late 2011 the international
community did not acknowledge the threat of Boko Haram to international interests, however a report issued in
November 2011 by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence, highlighted Boko Haram’s intent and capability to attack western interests
(Adesoji, 2011; US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Counterterroism and Intelligence, 2011).
Identification and proscription of Boko Haram within Nigeria as a terrorist organization can influence the
success of Australia’s efforts to curb terrorism internationally by early detection and prevention. Boko Haram’s
actions have security implications internationally, regionally and locally and there is a need for identification of
this threat and mitigation through counter terrorism efforts (Adesoji, 2011; Onuoha, 2012). There is real
potential for Boko Haram to join transnational jihadist movements providing an international security threat, as
well as providing an avenue for the radicalisation of African nationals within Australia, especially with an
increase in the of use of the internet by Boko Haram, with the internet being a popular tool in informing,
indoctrinating and radicalising individuals (Aly, 2011; Adesoji, 2011; Onuoha, 2012; US House of
Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterroism and Intelligence, 2011).
Australia already has a bilateral relationship with Nigeria and also provides aid for social and sustainable
economic development for communities fostering international cooperation (Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, 2008). According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics there are approximately 3646 Nigerian-born
residents within Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Africa has also increased in importance in
relation to Australia’s migration scheme with 248,699 African born residents within Australia recorded in the
2006 census (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009). The Counter-Terrorism White Paper has also identified the
threat of people raised in Australia becoming influenced by the jihadist message and generating attacks locally
(Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010).
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Comparison of Boko Haram and Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
As identified in the Criminal Code Act 1995 Section 102.1(1) a terrorist organization can be listed in
accordance with a proscription process set out in sub sections 102.1(2),(3) and (4). The Australian government
has documented under the Criminal Code Regulations 2002 Schedule 1 a list of proscribed terrorist
organizations. AQIM is a proscribed terrorist organization by the Australian government and can be compared
to Boko Haram for the purpose of illustrating similarities and the future need for Boko Haram to be proscribed.
Further this comparison is fruitful as intelligence from Algerian intelligence identifies coordination between
these groups (Australian Government [National Security], 2010; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence
and Security, 2011; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009, US House of Representatives Committee on
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterroism and Intelligence 2011). Factors for proscription through
this legislation include engagement in terrorism, ideology and links to other terrorist groups or networks, links
to Australia, threats to Australian interests, proscription by the UN or likeminded countries and engagement in
peace/mediation processes (House of Representatives Committee, 2006). In relation to listing organizations,
Boko Haram does engage in terrorism, intelligence has shown links to other terrorist groups and networks as
part of a global jihadist movement, AQIM and Somalia al Shabaab, and has no links to Australia or Australian
interests comparable to AQIM at this stage, however there is the potential (Australian Government [National
Security], 2011; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, 2011; Walker, 2012). Boko
Haram however has demonstrated a threat to western interests as detailed in the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence (2011) report on Boko
Haram. Three of Boko Haram’s members are also listed by the United States as Specially Designated Global
Terrorists under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224 (Adedoja, 2012; Lobe, 2012; Oluarotimi , 2012; Starr,
2012).
As a group, both organizations have similar motivation, being fundamentalist militant Islamist groups, and use
violence to achieve religious and political objectives of creating an Islamic state with Sharia law (Australian
Government [National Security], 2010; Jones, 2005; Soloman, 2012). This is identified in the Australian
National Counter Terrorism White Paper with the global Islamist movement being a threat to security interests
(Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010). Both groups can also be seen to coerce or influence by
intimidation their respective governments in aim to advance their causes (Australian Government [National
Security], 2010; Soloman, 2012). However their modus operandi can be seen to differentiate, with AQIM
prominent within Algeria and the Shahel region of northern Mali and with ties to a larger al-Qa’ida network
while Boko Haram consists of much smaller loose cell networks within a faction of a country (Australian
Government [National Security], 2010; Onuoha, 2012). Both groups tactics are consistent with the tactics
utilised by the religious wave of terrorism that employs suicide bombings and mass casualty attacks, however
their general targets differentiate with AQIM also targeting western symbols and influences in Algeria, Mali
and Niger as well as Algerian government and military interests, and Boko Haram targeting Nigerian interests,
infrastructure and symbols of authority (Australian Government [National Security], 2010; Rapoport, 2003; US
House of Representatives, 2011; Walker, 2012). The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities of
United States Africa Command has provided intelligence that members of Boko Haram have trained with
AQIM (US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterroism and
Intelligence, 2011). It can be seen that both groups display characteristics of the current wave of religious
terrorism and possess similarities, however on organizational scale, capacity and transnationalism nature AQIM
can be seen to be more advanced than Boko Haram (Walker, 2012). AQIM can also be seen to harbor stronger
anti-west ideals (Walker, 2012). Boko Haram has the capacity, if it continues coordinating with transnational
organizations such as al-Qa’ida, to pose a similar security threat to Australia as AQIM, particularly if a stronger
international anti-west sentiment is adopted as western interests have already been targeted by the attack on the
UN headquarters in Nigeria in 2011 (Adesoji, 2011; US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland
Security Subcommittee on Counterterroism and Intelligence 2011).
Boko Haram within the historical context of terrorist organizations
Terrorism can be placed contextually throughout history by various sects to achieve objectives through the use
of violence (Aly, 2011; Hoffman, 1998; Lutz & Lutz, 2008; Rasler & Thomspon, 2009). The modern
manifestation of terrorism can be described and contextualised by Rapoport’s four waves of modern terrorism
activity to assist with understanding terrorism within a global environment focusing on ideological motivations
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(Aly, 2011). Each wave is distinguished by political and social circumstances within the international
environment, patterns in objectives and tactics as well as impact on social and political structures and can be
used to support the notion that Boko Haram are indeed a terrorist organization as they illustrate elements
associated with the fourth religious wave of terrorism (Aly, 2011; Rapoport, 2003; Rasler & Thompson, 2009).
Boko Haram can be seen to exhibit similar tactics and motivations as the current wave of terrorism ‘religious’.
Religion acts as an ideological force, legitimiser and unifier of this group and aims to achieve one of the three
primary religious goals; establishment of a religiously pure state, establish religious governments or destruction
of Earth (Aly, 2011; Gregg, 2004; Johnson, 2011; Rapoport, 2003; Rasler & Thompson, 2009 ). Boko Haram
can be understood to aspire to achieve the creation of a religious government via religious reform (Onuoha,
2012; Solomon, 2012). Religious terrorists such as al-Qa’ida are inspired by interpretations of a text that
commands the creation of religious rule, in relation to Boko Haram this can be seen as the Qur’an and orthodox
militant Islamism via the assertion of Sharia law (Aly, 2011; Gregg, 2004).Tactics utilised in this wave heavily
involve the use of mass casualty attacks and suicide bombing, characteristic of the tactics used by Boko Haram
(Anonymous, 2012; McConnell, 2012; Rapoport, 2003; Rasler & Thompson, 2009). This aligns with religious
views and objectives in relation to Islam ‘martyrdom’ (Rapoport, 1984). Groups within the ‘religious wave’
organizational structure involve members with the same religious interpretation and include a spiritual leader,
distinct from other waves organizational structure to which is parallel to the structure of Boko Haram (Aly,
2011; Security in Nigeria, 2011). Other sects within this wave as identified by Rapoport (2003) include alQa’ida and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). In a pre-modern context parallels can be drawn with Boko Haram and the
Assassins (1090-1275 AD) which also targeted prominent political and state figures that didn’t recognise their
version of Islam in aim to establish an Islamic state (Aly, 2011; Horsely, 1979). A comparison of Boko Haram
contextually throughout history can be seen to support the notion that Boko Haram are indeed a terrorist
organization and utilise similar tactics as other religiously motivated terrorists organizations modern day.
Future prospects of Boko Haram
It is highly probable that Boko Haram will continue to commit acts of terrorism and sectarian violence due to
their ideological belief, current ability to gain funding, organizational structure, government deficits, ineffective
counter-measures by the Nigerian government, economic marginality and ability to recruit (Anonymous, 2011;
Soloman, 2012). Nigeria is a religiously heterogeneous, ethnically diverse, highly polarised country and the
government is ineffective in dealing with non-state groups such as Boko Haram, with Devlin-Foltz (2010)
describing the potential for this situation to be an incubator for international terrorism (Anonymous, 2011).
Anonymous (2011) states that Boko Haram could springboard into the remaining parts of Nigeria and that
eradication is increasingly difficult with the wider security force being infiltrated and corrupted by Boko Haram
members (Roti, 2012b; Soloman, 2012). Any productive efforts to label this group a terrorist organization
internationally and effectively counter the group will transpire when governments such as the Nigerian,
American, Australian government or United Nations acknowledge and proscribe Boko Haram as one (Soloman,
2012). The Australian government should use resources to analyse the possible threat of Boko Haram to
national security and interests and proscribe Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, to support possible counter
terrorism efforts if intelligence continues to support a threat to western interests and links between Boko Haram,
AQIM and al Shabaab. Although Australia in particular has not been specifically a target of an attack by Boko
Haram western interests have, and there is that potential, and the Australian government should prepare and
take this potential threat seriously. Terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula have quickly
escalated from regional targets to western international targets (US House of Representatives Committee,
2011). Adesoji (2011) asserts that due to the nature of global terrorism there is the ability for Boko Haram to
gain support or be influenced by the current global jihadist movement.

CONCLUSION
Boko Haram can be best defined as a terrorist group, as opposed to religious fanatics or freedom fighters.
Although seeming religiously motivated this group is also powerfully politically motivated. Boko Haram has
risen from political discontent and a change in the political landscape of Nigeria. This group has committed acts
of terrorism and several members are proscribed as terrorists, however the group is not as yet officially labelled
as a terrorist organization. The Nigerian government is labelling the group criminals and a ‘murderous religious
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group’, denying any benefits from the associated title and Islam as a legitimising tool. Through the inspection
of this sect’s philosophy and origins, and by comparing it against the Australian definition of terrorism and a
proscribed terrorist organization AQIM, defining Boko Haram as a terrorist organization can be supported. The
Australian government should take measures to proscribe Boko Haram as a terrorist group in the future in order
to apply counter terrorism measures to protect Australia’s security if Boko Haram continues to evolve and join
transnational Islamist movements.
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